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This book discusses sport in the context of some traditional philo-
sophical questions. What is a good human life? To whom do we 
look for ethical guidance? What is the meaning of life? (What is a 
meaningful life? What makes human activities or projects mean-
ingful?) These are big questions that have been important in the 
history of philosophy. I first considered referring to “sport and big 
questions” in the title, since the notions of good lives, ethical guid-
ance, and meaning are central in the book. I came to see that a 
reference to good lives was the unifying motif, and even the issue 
of meaning in life could be understood to be part of a larger reflec-
tion about how to live well, what are the constituents of good 
human lives, and how sport might fit into the picture. Also, whereas 
the consideration of the ethics of swearing, for example, might 
seem to be a puzzling addition to a book about sport and “big 
questions,” the arguments involved in considering whether we 
ought to cuss, inside and outside of sports, involve issues about 
how best to live.
 In relation to these unifying questions and issues, some of the 
specific topics in the book are less surprising than others. When 
thinking about the attraction and value of sports, some have empha-
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sized the role of play, as I do. Some have stressed the importance 
of our sport heroes as role models who can have a positive influ-
ence on others. In contrast, it is less common to consider pessimis-
tic views of sports that stress sport participants’ vulnerabilities, the 
ethics of swearing, coaches who use their authority to offer sage 
advice to their players about how to live well (coach as sage), and 
the conditions on the basis of which we consider lives and activi-
ties meaningful—with an eye toward the contribution of sports to 
meaningful lives.
 In the first part of the book, I begin by examining the extensive 
literature on play. I show that play resists a simple or parsimonious 
reduction to an attitude that engages an activity for its own sake 
(the common view among philosophers of sport). A pluralistic 
conception of play illuminates the relation between sport and play 
and the contribution of playful activities to good human lives. 
Next, I examine various reasons for pessimistic views of sport. I 
contrast an optimizing view of happiness, which stresses desire 
satisfaction, and the strategy of adaptation found in Stoicism, Bud-
dhism, and Taoism, which recommends wisely adapting one’s 
desires to the world in order to avoid unhappiness. Given the ways 
in which sport is a locus of vulnerability for participants, I argue 
for a moderate form of desire adaptation, including the modera-
tion of fans’ passionate desires for the success of their teams. This 
discussion leads naturally to a more extended examination of the 
ethics of supporting sports teams, which I offer in chapter 4. In 
the last chapter of part 1, I examine the ethics of using dirty lan-
guage, an unusual but fascinating topic. Because some of the com-
mon arguments for the elimination of cussing appeal to prudence, 
social good, and virtue, it is appropriate to examine this issue in 
the context of references that presuppose elements of living well. 
Furthermore, because dirty language is so prevalent in the world 
of sports, it is appropriate to focus on sport examples. The relevant 
arguments obviously extend beyond sports, however. I distinguish 
two extreme positions, the puritan rejection of swearing and the 
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vulgarian unqualified acceptance of potty mouth. I defend a posi-
tion I call “moderate vulgarianism.” I end the chapter with some 
practical suggestions.
 In part 2, I critically examine the common view that celebrated 
athletes are role models. I argue that the term role model is ambig-
uous, as are judgments that involve this notion. Once we distin-
guish being a role model in a narrow and a broad sense, and the 
difference between making a descriptive or a normative claim 
about role models, we are in a position to sort out the strengths 
and weaknesses of various claims about sports heroes as role mod-
els. I end the discussion by suggesting that we should think of our 
sports heroes as fictional objects that are imaginatively constructed 
in the context of the sports world, rather than everyday individu-
als like you and me. In this part I also examine another relatively 
unusual topic. Many view coaches as particularly well suited to 
offer various kinds of advice about how to win games, leadership, 
management skills, and so forth. Some coaches seem to think they 
are in a position to offer sage advice about how to live, as if they 
are more interested in the ethical development of the whole per-
son, not simply developing the person qua athlete. Although many 
have bemoaned contemporary athletes’ sense of entitlement (to 
act boorishly, selfishly, even violently), few have questioned coaches’ 
sense of entitlement to offer ethical instruction to athletes, espe-
cially in the context of college athletics. In this chapter I offer a 
discussion of a recent coach book whose pretensions are immod-
erate, especially when we think about such issues against the back-
ground of thoughtful advice offered in the history of philosophy, 
both Western and non-Western, about how to live well. After 
considering an alternative model of coaching and ethical guid-
ance, I offer some conclusions about the proper use of coaches’ 
authority.
 In the final part of the book I examine a topic that requires a 
wide-ranging examination of the recent literature, especially in 
analytic philosophy, about the question of the meaning of life. It 
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seems to be intuitively plausible to think of sports activities as 
meaningful and to believe that such activities contribute to mean-
ingful lives. It is not at all clear, however, what such claims mean. 
It is rare, in popular sports-talk discourse, to raise the possibility 
that sports participation is attractive and that it is so difficult for 
athletes to give up their involvement in sports, because such involve-
ments are meaningful. The common view is that athletes are moti-
vated by a thirst for competition. I examine the less common view 
that sports contribute meaning to lives. I discuss attempts to pro-
vide general accounts of meaningful lives in terms of conditions 
that must be met in order for lives to be meaningful. I do this in 
order to generate a broader view of the meaning of meaning in 
judgments about meaningful lives and activities. I offer a somewhat 
paradoxical view that the question of the meaning of life (or, rather, 
the conditions under which activities and lives are meaningful) is 
much less important than one might think. Meaning is everywhere. 
On the other hand, sport is more important than some think 
because it provides a significant space of meaning in life.
 I hope the book effectively balances topics that have been a part 
of scholarly philosophy of sport discussions (play, the ethics of sup-
porting sports teams, the role-model argument) and more unusual 
topics (sport and unhappiness, swearing, coach as sage, sport and 
the meaning of life) that may raise new questions for both scholars 
and generalists. My purpose is not only to raise questions, but also 
to offer alternative ways to look at sports and different ways to 
understand our attachments to these activities. As with my previ-
ous work, I confess that these philosophical reflections are personal, 
in the sense that I attempt to understand my own lifelong love 
affair with sport and my dissatisfaction with typical ways of talking 
about and understanding sports found in our commercial culture. 
There is more to sport than is suggested by the ethos that seems to 
be the common denominator expressed on sports-talk radio, on 
espn, and in other popular media outlets. There is more to sports 
than winning, competition, and money. We need alternative vocab-
Buy the Book
Introduction xi
ularies in order to understand ourselves as well as our involvements. 
In stressing my existential connection to these issues, I also assume 
that my own experiences as a player, coach, and fan (and university 
professor) have not been wholly idiosyncratic. For example, it may 
be unusual yet illuminating to attempt to develop attitudes toward 
sport that involve patterns of desire adaptation described in non-
Western approaches to life, or to understand part of the attractive-
ness of sport by using the category of meaning rather than the usual 
suspects.
 Some might complain that in some cases my discussion displaces 
sport as the central topic and uses it merely as an occasion to raise 
questions about traditional philosophical issues (the meaning of 
life) or topics that are larger than sport-specific issues (the ethics 
of speech). I do not see the alternatives as mutually exclusive. In 
much of the book sport is the central object of philosophical reflec-
tion. In some cases sport is used to occasion reflection on traditional 
philosophical issues, yet the ultimate goal is to illuminate sport, 
albeit in a somewhat more indirect way and in a manner that has 
implications for life outside sport. The chapter on sport and the 
question of the meaning of life requires an extended discussion of 
the types of answers that have been given by philosophers. Although 
the topic of sport may seem to be largely absent in that chapter 
(ignoring the introductory remarks and sport-related counterex-
amples), the point is to provide the philosophical background for 
an account of sport found in the final chapter. There, I suggest that 
sport is a significant “space of meaning” in life.
 I direct my book toward a diverse audience. Perhaps scholars will 
find in this book something worthy to consider, and both under-
graduates and graduate students might find interesting topics here. 
I would be disappointed, however, if the book proved to be less 
than accessible to a broader, literate audience. The Barnes and 
Noble crowd will find the writing clear, and some of my examples 
from contemporary sports will be familiar. They may have to work 
in places to follow my arguments, but there is nothing particularly 
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esoteric in any of my discussions. If you play or have played or 
coached these games, or if you find yourself often watching, listen-
ing to, or reading about these activities, I suspect you will find 
something of interest here, or at least something to think about 
and even contest. All of us, including sports geeks, are philosophers.
Buy the Book
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A Pluralist  
Conception of Play
The philosophical and scientific literature on play is extensive, and 
the approaches to the study, description, and explanation of play 
are diverse. In this chapter I intend to provide an overview of 
approaches to play. My interest is in describing the most funda-
mental categories in terms of which play is characterized, explained, 
and evaluated. Insofar as these categories attempt to describe what 
kind of reality we are talking about when we make claims about 
play, I hope to clarify the metaphysics of play. Once this categori-
cal scheme is made clear, we will be in a better position to evaluate 
the task of definition, claims about the relation of sport and play, 
and assertions about the significance of play. First, I place the dis-
cussion in the context of Bernard Suits’s account of play and some 
other recent approaches to play. Next, I distinguish the following 
approaches to play: play as behavior or action; play as motive, atti-
tude, or state of mind; play as form or structure; play as meaning-
ful experience; play as an ontologically distinctive phenomenon. 
There is a natural progression in the way the analysis unfolds. In 
the final section I argue that my analysis generates a pluralist, non-
reductive account of play.
1
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i. The Question of Play
It may appear that there is very little new under the sun for a phi-
losopher to say about play. This is in striking contrast to the grow-
ing science of play. In various scientific fields there are lively and 
ongoing debates about the evolutionary and neuroscientific bases 
of play, occasioning numerous research programs and new theories 
about what is going on when animals and children, especially, 
engage in playful behavior. Scientists seem not to be as worried 
about the kinds of questions that worry philosophers, yet such 
questions cannot be ignored, except by stipulation. What is play? 
Can it be defined? How is it recognized? Is it good? Why is it good? 
How is play related to other significant cultural activities, like art 
or religion? What is the relation between sport and play? How does 
play contribute to a good life?
 I have been impressed recently by the differences between more 
simplified accounts of play and the enormous diversity of play 
phenomena that are mentioned and studied outside of philosophy 
of sport by scholars in various fields. Whereas some philosophical 
discussions have focused on the canonical texts written by Johan 
Huizinga and Roger Caillois,¹ and have generated relatively broad 
notions of play involving a variety of characteristics, others have 
been suspicious of the supposed scope of play. Yet when some sci-
entifically informed scholars have been forced to offer a definition 
or a philosophical account of play, they inevitably turn to Huizinga 
and offer at least a variation on a theme described in Homo Ludens.
Bernard Suits, eminent philosopher of sport and “paidiatrician,” 
has produced an account of play that some philosophical scholars 
of sport have largely taken for granted. His “words on play” have 
been taken to be the final words, so to speak. It is against the back-
ground of his provocative early essay on play (as well as some later 
comments) that I wish to rethink some issues concerning the unity 
and diversity of play, its relation to sport, and its value.²
 In his essay “Words on Play,” Suits combines his interest in pur-
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suing the traditional philosophical task of definition with his sus-
picion about claims concerning the scope of play phenomena. Why 
look for a definition of play? Why attempt to overcome Wittgen-
steinian objections to such a task? Suits responds: “chiefly because 
a definition is a kind of restriction or limitation, and I believe that, 
ever since Huizinga began to find play under nearly every rock in 
the social landscape, quite a bit too much has been made of the 
notion.”³
 Early on Suits offers three claims that are particularly relevant 
for this discussion. First, he agrees with the common view that play 
involves activities that are ends in themselves or desired for their 
own sake. All play is autotelic, as opposed to instrumental. Auto-
telicity is a necessary condition of play, but he denies that all auto-
telic activities are instances of play. “In other words, I regard auto-
telicity as necessary but not sufficient for an adequate definition 
of play.” Next, he denies that there is a logical relation between 
playing and playing games. Despite the fact that we speak of “play-
ing” games, he considers such usages to indicate merely that we are 
participating in a game; we may or may not be playing. For exam-
ple, when we speak of playing a musical instrument, we are indi-
cating performance, not necessarily play. Sometimes game playing 
is playing, but it may not be, because of the autotelicity require-
ment. This leads Suits to say the following (which many take to be 
obvious—I don’t): “That one has to be playing in order to be play-
ing a game seems equally implausible. When professional athletes 
are performing in assigned games for wages, although they are 
certainly playing games, we are not at all inclined to conclude from 
that fact that they are without qualification playing. For we think 
of professional athletes as working when they play their games and 
as playing when they go home from work to romp with their chil-
dren.” Third, Suits recognizes that his account of play (which I will 
mention in a moment) is at odds with a variety of common usages, 
yet he insists that such figurative or metaphorical usages are none-
theless valuable. If we combine an account that places a boundary 
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on the concept of play and an awareness of the vast array of ordi-
nary usages of the word, we identify a helpful avenue of inquiry, 
“since an explanation of how they are figurative requires a sorting 
out of the respects in which the thing at issue is, and the respects 
in which it is not, play or a game.”4
 For Suits the sorting is relatively simple, because we merely have 
to relate autotelicity (a genus) to the way we use resources in certain 
activities (a specific difference). For example, little Johnny is 
rebuked for playing with his food, a resource normally used for 
nutrition. Here is Suits’s definition of play: “X is playing if and only 
if x has made a temporary reallocation to autotelic activities of 
resources primarily committed to instrumental activities.”5 Accord-
ing to Suits, when we temporarily reallocate any resource to intrin-
sically valued activities, including time or energy, we are playing.
 For now, let’s turn from Suits’s words on play to some other 
recent words, written by, respectively, Colin McGinn, a very fine 
philosopher; Diane Ackerman, a very fine essayist and poet; and 
Stuart Brown, a very fine (I presume) medical doctor, psychiatrist, 
and clinical researcher. First is a comment from McGinn, in a book 
about sport and a discussion of his attempt to improve his tennis 
game:
Certainly, tennis, like other sports, is a form of play. . . . Play is a vital 
part of any full life, and a person who never plays is worse than a “dull 
boy”: he or she lacks imagination, humour and a proper sense of value. 
Only the bleakest and most life-denying Puritanism could warrant 
deleting all play from human life. . . . Play is part of what makes human 
life worthwhile, and we should seek to get as much out of it as we can.6
 In a beautiful book-length meditation on “deep play,” the most 
deeply absorbing and “ecstatic” form of play, Diane Ackerman 
writes:
The spirit of deep play is central to the life of each person, and also to 
society, inspiring the visual, musical, and verbal arts; exploration and 
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discovery; war; law; and other elements of culture we’ve come to cher-
ish (or dread). . . .
 This book is not a conclusion but an exploration. It invites you to 
look closely at the human saga, and consider how much of it revolves 
around play. . . . Indeed, it’s our passion for deep play that makes us the 
puzzling and at times resplendent beings we are.7
 Finally, Stuart Brown, founder of the National Institute on Play, 
expresses thoughts based on forty years of conducting play studies 
and taking more than six thousand “play histories” of all kinds of 
people:
I have found that remembering what play is all about and making it 
part of our daily lives are probably the most important factors in being 
a fulfilled human being. . . .
 I don’t think it is too much to say that play can save your life. It cer-
tainly has salvaged mine. Life without play is a grinding, mechanical exis-
tence organized around doing things necessary for survival. Play is the stick 
that stirs the drink. It is the basis of all art, games, books, sports, movies, 
fashion, fun, and wonder—in short, the basis of what we think of as civi-
lization. Play is the vital essence of life. It is what makes life lively. . . .
 The world needs play because it enables each person to live a good 
life.8
 The contrast between Suits’s attitude and approach and these 
enthusiastic claims about the value of play is noteworthy. When 
Suits considers play, he thinks there is much less there than meets 
the eye. He offers a tidy conceptual analysis that attempts to deflate 
the Huizingian notion that there is “play under nearly every rock 
in the social landscape.” On the other hand, these contemporary 
playologists (if I may coin a term) do see the pervasive influence 
and importance of play in human life. Huizinga was right, they tell 
us. Play is under a lot of rocks. Diane Ackerman makes the influ-
ence of Huizinga explicit: “From time to time, this book becomes 
a fantasia on a theme by Huizinga, in which I play with some of his 
Buy the Book
6 Sport and Good Lives
ideas, amplify them, follow their shadows and nuances.” Brown 
gets no further than chapter 2 before he brings his own “founda-
tional definition” into relation with Huizinga’s famous discussion. 
Although McGinn does not explicitly mention Huizinga, his com-
ments about entering a magical world with its own rules and goals, 
play and seriousness, freedom, and ridding ourselves of ordinary 
existence are well-known elements in Huizinga’s analysis.9 One 
problem with Suits’s approach is this: Should we accept his defini-
tion, we would have no idea, based on his account, why so much 
has been made of making a “temporary reallocation to autotelic 
activities of resources primarily committed to instrumental activi-
ties.” We are left in the dark about the common forms and experi-
ences of activities that typically involve such reallocation and why 
our neo-Huizingians value it so highly.
 Now contrast Suits’s definition with Huizinga’s frequently cited 
words on play summarizing his account. (This will be a useful ref-
erence for the following discussion.)
Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might call it a free 
activity standing quite consciously outside “ordinary” life as being “not 
serious,” but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly. 
It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no profit can 
be gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time 
and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It pro-
motes the formation of social groupings which tend to surround them-
selves with secrecy and to stress their difference from the common 
world by disguise or other means.
 . . . Play is a voluntary activity or occupation executed within cer-
tain fixed limits of time and place, according to rules freely accepted 
but absolutely binding, having its aim in itself and accompanied by a 
feeling of tension, joy and the consciousness that it is “different” from 
“ordinary life.”¹0
 It is evident from this brief overview of claims about play that 
there are different approaches to the study, description, and evalu-
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ation of play. Undoubtedly, there is a startling diversity of phenom-
ena associated with play. A noted scholar of play, Brian Sutton-
Smith, refers to the “ambiguity of play” in his important book, but 
he is most interested in what he calls “the ideological underpinnings 
of play theories.” My focus will be on the attempt to understand 
the diversity of play phenomena rather than the diversity of play 
scholarship and what he calls the “rhetorics,” or rhetorical under-
pinnings, of different theories of play.¹¹
ii. Approaches to Play
A. Play as Behavior or Action
Diane Ackerman begins her book by saying, “Everyone understands 
play.” In one sense that is not quite right, because there is consid-
erable controversy about the question of definition. We can, how-
ever, wield the concept and recognize paradigm cases of play. That 
is because play is initially categorized as a kind of behavior. It is 
something we can see or observe. It has been and continues to be 
extensively studied by scientists who are interested in both animal 
and human play. My son picks up our dog’s chew toy, and she 
immediately perks up, exhibits the “play bow,” paws outstretched 
on the floor with her rump raised in the air, and wants the toy to 
be thrown, after which she sprints to the toy, then coyly brings it 
back, waiting for it to be tossed again. Chimps exhibit a “play face,” 
analogous to the look of the joyous, smiling faces of children play-
ing at the playground, running, jumping, skipping—spontaneous, 
improvisational, vigorous, unrestrained. Scientists tell us that play 
is prominent throughout the animal kingdom, not just in mam-
mals. We are told that “animal play researchers have established 
specific criteria that define play behavior,” and that “most species 
have 10 to 100 distinct play signals that they use to solicit play or 
to reassure one another during play-fighting that it’s still all just 
fun.”¹² In more primitive forms, play is pure movement and 
motion, for no apparent reason. When animals are playing in the 
wild, they are not looking for food or being attentive to threats 
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from the environment. When children are playing, they are not 
living under the constraints of material needs or desires. They are 
“just playing,” freely and exuberantly. They appear to be enjoying 
themselves immensely, like the two juvenile grizzly bears in the 
Alaskan wilderness observed by Stuart Brown and Bob Fagen, an 
expert on animal play behavior. Brown asks why the bears are play-
ing. Fagen replies, “Because it’s fun.” Brown says, “No, Bob, I mean 
from a scientific point of view.”¹³
 The exchange between the two is interesting because it both 
separates and connects the notions of animal behavior and human 
activity, or play as behavior and play as activity. Play behavior in 
animals is “apparently purposeless,” as biologists claim.¹4 When 
animals are playing, they are not, apparently, engaged in any kind 
of instrumental activity associated with their survival needs. Their 
play may be “fun,” as the animal behavior scientist claims, but there 
must be something biologically deeper going on. Because of the 
prevalence of play in animals there is the presumption that there 
must be some adaptive advantage associated with play behavior. 
This generates scientific theories about the biological usefulness of 
“apparently” biologically useless behavior. When pushed, Fagen 
says, “In a world continuously presenting unique challenges and 
ambiguity, play prepares these bears for an evolving planet.”¹5 Other 
scientists have added to or revised the play-as-preparation hypoth-
esis, arguing that play contributes to neural development (the 
growth of the cerebellum and the development of the brain’s fron-
tal cortex) and more flexible and responsive brains.¹6
 When we turn to human play, especially the play of children, 
we can ask the same sort of questions about such behavior. Play is 
unproductive, insofar as it is not obviously pursued for the sake of 
satisfying material needs. It seems as wasteful and superfluous as 
animal play, a useless squandering of energy. We are animals, of 
course, so play can be studied from the standpoint of understand-
ing the paradox of behavior that is both apparently useless yet has 
some adaptive advantages. But behavior may now be thought of 
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as action, which humans may explicitly and self-consciously choose 
to engage in at least at some point in development. It is still pre-
conscious and preverbal in certain contexts and to a certain devel-
opmental stage, as Brown says,¹7 and extremely varied, but now it 
may be approached in terms of its unique phenomenology, which 
is described as extending from children to adults. The concept of 
“apparent purposelessness” in animal behavior leaves open the issue 
of play’s biological usefulness and allows the scientist to speculate 
about animal psychology. The bears certainly appeared to be hav-
ing fun. For human play, the concept of “apparent purposelessness” 
leads naturally to the issue of what it means to choose an action 
for its own sake, or what it means to desire an activity as an end 
rather than as a means to some further end. It leads inevitably to 
considering psychological elements that are involved in playing, 
that is, engaging in intrinsically valued activities.
B. Play as Motive, Attitude, or State of Mind
For some philosophers of sport, like Bernard Suits (as we have seen) 
and Klaus Meier, it is a bit of a truism to say that play essentially 
involves an attitudinal component. The key to play is autotelicity, 
engaging in activities for their own sake or as ends in themselves. 
This involves the question of the de facto motives, reasons, or pur-
poses involved when activities are undertaken. According to Suits, 
play requires that an activity is valued for itself. Meier holds that 
“autotelicity is both a necessary and sufficient trait” for play. As he 
says, “I wish to provide a definition based on the orientation, 
demeanor, or stance of the participants.” Play requires intrinsic 
reasons, and if our reason (exclusive? predominant?) for doing what-
ever we choose to do is intrinsic to the activity, it is play. “Conse-
quently, if games or sports are pursued voluntarily and for intrinsic 
reasons, they are play forms; if they are pursued involuntarily or 
engaged in predominantly for extrinsic rewards, they are not play 
forms.”¹8 Angela Schneider echoes these views when she claims 
that judging an activity to be play “is determined not by the nature 
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of the activity itself . . . but rather by the attitude of the player 
toward the activity.” As she says, “Playing is not a type of activity, 
but rather a mode of performing any activity.”¹9 These comments 
distinguish play as an attitude (or having an essential attitudinal 
component), and classifying an activity as play depends on the 
context within which it is performed in specific circumstances, 
rather than its structure.
 This way of approaching play raises the issue of the relation 
between claims about play as an activity and play as attitudinal. 
Stuart Brown describes cases of golfers he has seen playing Pebble 
Beach who, instead of enjoying the experience of playing one of 
the most famous and spectacular golf courses in the world, trans-
form what should be a highlight of their golfing experiences into 
misery and unhappiness. Brown denies that they are playing. “They 
are self-critical, competitive, perfectionistic, and preoccupied with 
the last double bogey. These emotions don’t allow them to feel the 
playful, out-of-time, in-the-zone, doing-it-for-its-own-sake sensa-
tion that accompanies joyful playfulness.” From our tennis matches 
to our pickup basketball games, most of us have encountered the 
tortured player whose misery and unhappiness infect all those with 
whom he is playing. This leads Brown to say the following: “Some-
times running is play, and sometimes it is not. What is the differ-
ence between the two? It really depends on the emotions experi-
enced by the runner. Play is a state of mind, rather than an 
activity.”²0
 This emphasis on the attitudinal component of play may be 
misleading. It may lead to a confusion between an activity and an 
attitude. To say that play “is a state of mind,” as Brown does, does 
not really make sense if we interpret the claim literally. Play is an 
activity that may or may not require a certain kind of attitude, but 
the attitude is not the activity itself. Would it make sense to say 
that we are playing when in fact we are doing nothing, perhaps 
paralyzed in a drug-induced but affirmative haze of consciousness, 
glad to be experiencing paralysis for its own sake? (Assume no “play 
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of ideas” going on in the mind of person.) If a person were hooked 
up to an experience machine (in Robert Nozick’s famous thought 
experiment), electrodes attached to his brain, giving him mental 
states (“experiences”) while he is floating like a blob in a tank, it 
would make no sense to say that the person could be playing. (Let’s 
say he is being fed the joyful experience of winning the U.S. Open 
in golf.) It would make more sense to say that the person has play-
ful attitudes, or the “state of mind” associated with play. The mis-
erable golfers are doing something—they are playing golf, unhap-
pily and without any joy. Better to say, as Suits, Meier, and 
Schneider do, that play is an activity that requires a certain kind 
of attitude, or is defined in terms of the attitude we take toward 
the activity, that is, an activity engaged in as an end in itself or for 
intrinsic reasons.
 Despite the fact that many philosophers of sport take this posi-
tion to be obvious, some puzzling questions arise. If autotelicity is 
sufficient for play, as Meier insists, does this mean that we could, 
in principle, transform any activity into play? Would Sisyphus’s 
interminable rock rolling be magically transformed into play if the 
gods injected a magic potion into his veins that caused him to 
identify with his pointless toil? How about an apolitical function-
ary who spends his free time volunteering at Auschwitz, enjoying 
the unpaid activity of marching the Jews to the gas chambers? Fun? 
Is he playing? We may say that these activities are play for these 
persons, but, at the least, it strikes us that these are not the kind of 
activities that are either commonly or even appropriately catego-
rized as play, as they would have to be if autotelicity were sufficient 
for play. This raises the question of whether certain kinds of formal 
requirements might be, if not necessary, at least typical and caus-
ally relevant for appropriateness. It would be helpful to be able to 
say more about the form or structure of activities for which it would 
be appropriate to have intrinsic reasons to perform them. Recall 
Colin McGinn’s comment that tennis, like other sports, is a form 
of play. If I understand his claim, he holds that tennis, as such, is 
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play, or sports, as such, are play activities. Suits finds these claims 
to be ridiculous. He says, “I have never—anywhere—made, or even 
entertained, the ridiculous assertions that some games or sports as 
such are play or that some as such are not.”²¹ It is not clear to me 
why it is ridiculous to assert that play activities may have formal 
or structural requirements. It is also unclear what sort of argument 
is offered for the view that autotelicity is necessary and sufficient 
for play, other than the claim that it is just obvious in paradigm 
cases. If the argument is ultimately a phenomenological one, the 
phenomena require a more nuanced and thicker description.
 This line of argument leads to questions about mixed motives. 
Suits also seems to think it is obvious that when professional ath-
letes are playing games, they are not really engaged in play because 
they are being paid. They are working, not playing. As we will see, 
they are engaged in activities that have a certain structure, but if 
play requires autotelicity, professional game playing is instrumen-
tal, not autotelic. Furthermore, Suits offers the provocative thesis 
that Olympic athletes, “amateurs” in some sense, are not playing 
when participating in Olympic events, because they are acting under 
a compulsion to win the gold medal rather than being motivated 
to engage in their Olympic athletic activities simply for the sake of 
participation. Pickup games are autotelic; highly competitive Olym-
pic events are not. Suits says, “I am suggesting that acting under 
such a compulsion, rather than the desire to win simply because 
winning defines the activity one is undertaking, is what turns a 
game that could be play into something that is not play.”²²
 The problem is that when we engage in certain activities, we 
may have a variety of motives. Even if autotelicity is necessary for 
play, it is not clear why an activity that has some external end could 
not also be desired for its own sake. Suppose I love to throw a rub-
ber ball against a wall and catch it with my bare hands. I then 
develop some rules. I throw at certain angles, at certain spots, with 
certain velocities, and I see if I can catch the ball before it bounces 
a specified number of times within a defined space. I establish a 
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point system. I love playing wall ball! I tell my good friend how 
much fun I have playing wall ball, and he joins me. We develop 
our skills, play tense and competitive games, and deeply enjoy our 
encounters. Our friends hear about wall ball and want to watch, 
but we decide to make them pay for the pleasure of being specta-
tors. Now we are professional wall ballers! We are admired. We 
establish a league. More people want to watch . . . According to 
Suits and many others, it makes no sense to ask whether wall ball, 
as such, is a playful activity, since it depends on participants’ atti-
tudes. Was wall ball transformed into “work” as soon as I was paid? 
Suppose that I was extremely happy to be paid for playing wall 
ball, grateful that I could play my game for money, and hopeful 
that I could continue to play and that I never lost my love for the 
game. In fact, my attitudes could be quite complex. My desires 
could be characterized as conditional or hypothetical. I am happy 
to be paid for playing wall ball, but I would play even if I did not 
get paid.
 Consider another example, somewhat closer to home. My job is 
to teach and engage in philosophy. As an undergraduate I received 
no compensation for this. As a graduate student I received a stipend 
to study and teach. At one point philosophy became my job, my 
work, yet doing philosophy is, in an important sense, something I 
do for the immense satisfaction it gives me. It is valued as an end, 
despite the fact that the activity can also be characterized instru-
mentally. It is something I would continue to do whether or not I 
am paid to do it. My motives are mixed; my attitudes are complex.²³
 Play is attitudinally more complex than Suits and others seem 
to think. Consider another aspect of this complexity. Wall ball, like 
other games, is strictly conventional. It is made-up. Its rules are 
imaginative constructions that are the conditions for a certain kind 
of activity to occur, that is, conditions for playing wall ball. It is 
not work, art, science, religion, poetry, war, or anything else. As 
Huizinga says, “It’s not ‘ordinary’ or ‘real’ life. It is rather a step-
ping out of ‘real’ life into a temporary sphere of activity with a 
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disposition all of its own.” He is talking about play. I am talking 
about wall ball as a form of play. Huizinga continues by giving the 
example of the young child playing “trains,” pretending that chairs 
are something else than “real life,” and urging Daddy to act accord-
ingly. He says, “This ‘only pretending’ quality of play betrays a 
consciousness of the inferiority of play compared with ‘seriousness,’ 
a feeling that seems to be something as primary as play itself.” Here 
I would speak of a distinctive attitude toward playful activities. 
They are not “serious,” yet they can be wholly absorbing and 
engaged in quite seriously. I have called such an attitude “serious 
nonseriousness.”²4 Even professional athletes are sometimes pushed 
in times of crisis to admit the “nonserious” character of their activ-
ity. A young Major League Baseball pitcher is killed in a car crash. 
One of his teammates sadly comments, “This is real life, not base-
ball.” The attitude taken by the professional baseball player is essen-
tially related to the form or structure of the activity, as if such an 
attitude is appropriate because baseball, as such, is not “real life.” 
Play is structurally nonserious.
 One other element of attitudinal complexity is important. When 
the scientist is asked why the bears play, he says, “Because it’s fun.” 
We may not be sure about bear phenomenology, but when we 
consider the play of children and adults, when we think of our 
youthful and grown-up play, it is natural to speak of fun, joy, enjoy-
ment, or satisfaction. Brown says his miserable golfers did not feel 
the “playful, out-of-time, in-the-zone, doing-it-for-its-own-sake 
sensation [emphasis added] that accompanies joyful playfulness.” 
The pleasure of play, however, is not like the pleasure of sensations 
in which we take delight—the pleasurable sounds, tastes, smells, 
and feel of ordinary experiences, such as the pleasurable sensation 
of orgasm. Fred Feldman’s recent defense of hedonism makes 
explicit what has been implicit in important historical accounts of 
the value and kinds of pleasure, including Epicurus’s account of 
the good life. Feldman distinguishes sensory pleasure and attitudi-
nal pleasure. Sensory pleasures are feelings, that is, pleasurable sen-
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sations. Attitudinal pleasures need not be felt. “A person takes 
attitudinal pleasure in some state of affairs if he enjoys it, is pleased 
by it, is glad that it is happening, is delighted by it.” Feldman gives 
the example of a person being pleased by the fact that there are no 
wars going on in the world. I may be pleased by Barack Obama’s 
being elected president, or I may enjoy the company of a good 
friend. Attitudinal pleasures are intentional, and they need not have 
the “feel” of sensations. “We know we have them not by sensation, 
but in the same way (whatever it may be) that we know when we 
believe something, or hope for it, or fear that it might happen.”²5 
(These are propositional attitudes.)
 For many, sport is a rich source of attitudinal pleasure. It was for 
me. It is also clear that there is a close relationship between enjoy-
ing an activity and desiring to engage in it for its own sake. If we 
add that certain kinds of activities are such that their form or struc-
ture occasions an attitudinal recognition of being set apart from 
“real life,” then we have arrived at a more complex attitudinal 
account of play, whose elements may have an equal claim in locat-
ing or categorizing an activity as play. Why shouldn’t we take the 
attitudinal recognition of the conventional nature of certain kinds 
of activities as sufficient for play? But now more needs to be said 
about the formal or structural elements in play activities. Whatever 
other motives or attitudes a person might have, if an activity is 
enjoyed, attitudinally recognized as not “real life,” and intrinsically 
attractive, regardless of other motives, then there are good reasons 
to categorize it as play—independent of whether a person is also 
being paid to perform the activity.
C. Play as Form or Structure
The emphasis on form or structure redirects our attention to fea-
tures of the activity itself rather than the subjectivity of the player. 
It also makes way for an approach that emphasizes relational ele-
ments or the interplay between subjectivity and features of the 
activity. The emphasis on form or structure—here, lack of form or 
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structure—first appeared in the description of animal behavior and 
children’s play as improvisational and spontaneous rather than 
mechanical and determined. Suits distinguishes primitive play—the 
baby splashing water in the bathtub—and sophisticated play, which 
involves rules and the development of skills. Kenneth Schmitz cat-
egorizes play in terms of a continuum from the least formal to the 
most formal types: frolic, make-believe, sporting skills, and games. 
Play need not be formal, but it often is. It is especially the gamelike 
elements of formal play that are relevant when considering whether 
it is reasonable to claim that sports or games as such are play—
despite the fact that Suits and others may believe such assertions 
are “ridiculous.” This is because it is plausible to claim, as Suits does, 
that “the elements of sport are essentially—although perhaps not 
totally—the same as elements of game.”²6
 Suits’s insightful and familiar account of the elements of playing 
games provides the basis for an emphasis on play as activity having 
a certain form or structure and the claim that sport as such is activ-
ity having this structure. First, games are means-ends activities; 
they have a structure in which means are related to ends in a spec-
ified manner. There are goals that may be described independently 
of the respective games, like a golf ball coming to rest in a cup, a 
basketball going through a hoop, a soccer ball entering a netted 
goal, or a football being carried beyond a certain point. But these 
goals may be brought about in a variety of ways. I may place the 
golf ball in the cup with my hand, climb a ladder to put the bas-
ketball through a hoop, and so forth. Games are developed when 
means are limited by specific rules that prescribe and proscribe the 
ways in which goals may be brought about, transforming prelusory 
goals (pregame goals) into lusory ends (ends intrinsic to the game), 
one of which is to win the game by achieving certain lusory goals. 
Since the means specified by the rules always rule out the most 
efficient way to achieve a prelusory goal, games are quite unlike 
real life, in which efficiency is often the hallmark of rationality. 
Hence, because of their structure, games do require an attitude that 
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allows for the injection of gratuitous difficulty into life simply for 
the sake of the occurrence of the activity itself. Suits summarizes 
the elements of playing games in the following definition: “To play 
a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs (pre-lusory 
goal), using only means permitted by rules (lusory means), where 
the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favor of less efficient 
means (constitutive rules), and where such rules are accepted just 
because they make possible such activity (lusory attitude). I also 
offer the following only approximately accurate, but more pithy, 
version of the above definition: Playing a game is the voluntary 
attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.”²7
 To say, as Huizinga does, that play is not “ordinary” or “real life,” 
or to claim, as Roger Caillois does, that play is both “separate” and 
“unproductive,” is to acknowledge a formal or structural feature of 
play.²8 Formal play, by its very nature, is not instrumental, in the 
sense in which instrumentality is understood in everyday life. To 
say that play is “superfluous,” as Huizinga does, or to claim that 
playing games involves gratuitous difficulty or the overcoming of 
unnecessary obstacles, affirms the difference between a world of 
play, with its own meanings—its own requirements and delimita-
tions of space or time—and ordinary life. To say that games are 
not “serious” is to equivocate, unless it is clear that nonseriousness 
may be a claim about either the structure of the activity or the atti-
tude of the player. Caillois says, “The confused and intricate laws 
of ordinary life are replaced in this fixed space and for this given 
time, by precise, arbitrary, unexceptionable rules that must be 
accepted as such and that govern the correct playing of the game.”²9 
When the professional baseball player speaks of death as a part of 
“real life” compared to baseball (not “real life”), he is recognizing 
the difference between ordinary means-ends activities in life and 
the structure of formal play, that is, the playing of games. Some 
play is improvisational and joyous; other forms of play express our 
attraction to gratuitous difficulty and the value we place on over-
coming obstacles, even unnecessary ones. And many complex forms 
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of play may well involve both: bursts of speed, creative physical 
movements, and spontaneity within the limits of the rules of the 
game or activity.³0
 Suits ends one of his influential essays on sport, play, and game 
by referring to a New Yorker cartoon in which an angry golfer is 
saying something to his partner: “The caption reads, ‘Stop saying 
it’s just a game! Goddamit, it’s not just a game!’ And he is quite 
right. For him, golf is not play, and so it is not, therefore just a 
game.”³¹ I would say that Suits’s comment misleadingly reduces 
play to activity defined merely in terms of an attitude, ignores the 
formal aspects of the game of golf that are relevant in determining 
its character as play, and diminishes the experiential complexity of 
the activity, which may also be relevant in our judgments about 
play. For me, the cartoon suggests that the golfer has a rather shal-
low appreciation of the playful possibilities that are available in the 
experience of playing golf—at least in this particular example. How 
are such possibilities described?
D. Play as Meaningful Experience
When we conceive of play as a certain kind of attitude that can be 
intentionally directed toward any kind of activity (object), or we 
think of play activity itself as having a certain form or structure, it 
is as if we are focusing on two poles or aspects of experience that 
are importantly related or whose interplay constitutes a richer 
account of play phenomena. For many descriptions of the features 
of play it is less misleading to speak of the lived experience of the 
player interacting with her environment or becoming experientially 
involved with something other than herself. When different aspects 
of play experience are described, at least some of these features are 
at the same time both formal elements of the activity and psycho-
logical features of the agent. To say that play is “uncertain,” as Cail-
lois does, describes both the course of undetermined events and the 
experience of the tension of not knowing what will happen or who 
will win. For these approaches, a dualism that abstractly separates 
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subject and object is phenomenologically inadequate, although 
some features may seem to focus more on one aspect of playful 
involvement than another. In the following, I will mention various 
characteristics of play without taking the time to offer an extended 
analysis of each feature—which would require considerable space. 
My procedure illustrates the difference between a focus on attitude 
or state of mind, which subjectivizes play, and experiential proper-
ties that are occasioned by involvements that require an account of 
that with which one is involved or which cannot be reduced simply 
to states of mind. After mentioning various characteristics, I will 
refer to some lists of properties, including Huizinga’s (as we have 
seen) and Caillois’s, to make the discussion more manageable.
 First, here are some features of play that have been emphasized 
and analyzed in the expansive literature on the subject: play is activ-
ity characterized by freedom, separateness, nonseriousness, illusion, 
unreality, delimitation of space and time, isolation, purposeless-
ness, order, make-believe, a play world, superfluousness, suspension 
of the ordinary, internal or intrinsic meaning, inherent attraction, 
unalienated participation, internal purposiveness, serious nonseri-
ousness, diminished consciousness of self, unselfing, absorption, 
responsive openness, attunement, experience of difficulty, overcom-
ing obstacles, risk taking, finitude, narrative structure, unity, con-
tingency, possibility, uncertainty, spontaneity, improvisation—and 
fun. I am sure I have not exhausted the possibilities!
 Recall Huizinga’s summary definition in which each part is sig-
nificant and analyzed at some length. Huizinga insists that all “play 
means something,” and later states, “We shall try to take play as 
the player himself takes it: in its primary significance.” When we 
attend to the experience of play, parsimonious descriptions are 
impossible because of the experiential richness of these activities. 
The freedom of play is both attitudinal, in which a player deeply 
enjoys engaging in such activities, and experiential, in which 
involvement with a wholly conventional play world separates a 
player from the cares of ordinary life. The experience of “secluded-
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ness,” “isolation,” or even “tension” is the experience of structure, 
and it is attitudinally significant. “Experience” describes the abun-
dant unity of meaningful activity (movement) and valuable inten-
tional attitudes. Likewise, Caillois’s list of the essential properties 
of play is best interpreted as an attempt to describe the essential 
experiences involved in the playing of games: play is free (not oblig-
atory), separate (limited in space and time), uncertain (outcomes 
are not determined in advance and are due to players’ innovations), 
unproductive (no new goods are created), governed by rules (con-
ventional suspension of ordinary norms), and make-believe (an 
awareness of the unreality of the play world).³²
 Although Stuart Brown claims at one point in his interesting 
recent book that play is a “state of mind,” when he initially and 
tentatively offers a “foundational definition” of play, in large part 
for heuristic reasons, the properties he mentions richly combine 
claims about movement, attitude, structure, and experience. Here 
are the properties he lists, along with a brief description of each:
?? apparently purposeless (done for its own sake)
?? voluntary (“not obligatory or required by duty”)
?? inherent attraction (“It’s fun. It makes you feel good. . . . It’s 
a cure for boredom.”)
?? freedom from time (“When we are fully engaged in play, we 
lose a sense of the passage of time.”)
?? diminished consciousness of self (“We stop worrying about 
whether we look good or awkward, smart or stupid. . . . We 
are fully in the moment, in the zone.”)
?? improvisational potential (“We aren’t locked into a rigid way 
of doing things. We are open to serendipity, to change. . . . 
The result is that we stumble upon new behaviors, thoughts, 
strategies, movements, or ways of being.”)
?? continuation desire (“We desire to keep doing it, and the plea-
sure of the experience drives the desire. We find ways to keep 
it going. . . . And when it is over, we want to do it again.”)³³
Buy the Book
A Pluralist Conception of Play 21
 Parts of Brown’s list of properties are quite familiar after having 
considered briefly the seminal accounts of play found in Huizinga 
and Caillois. Some of the properties add additional or even new 
insights when we consider the experiential richness of play. The 
absorption described by Huizinga becomes “diminished conscious-
ness of self ” as players are fully involved in the activity of cycling, 
windsurfing, tennis, and the like. Improvisational potential con-
nects the frolic of animals and children to the openness and free 
play of possibilities in rule-governed play. The category of impro-
visation describes the phenomenology of movement, a certain kind 
of kinesthetic freedom. Continuation desire is connected to atti-
tudinal pleasure and the structure of repetition emphasized by Huiz-
inga: “In this faculty of repetition lies one of the most essential 
qualities of play.”³4 Games begin, are played out, even end, only 
to be repeated by players who want to continue playing, over and 
over. When Brown speaks of freedom from time, the language is 
experiential rather than structural. Time is experienced differently 
because the time internal to the game—due to the way that the 
game is temporally articulated according to rules—is often quite 
different from ordinary clock time. Play time starts and stops, 
speeds up and slows down, extends limitlessly, or is extinguished. 
Or, when we are absorbed in the activity, “in the moment,” we lose 
our sense of the flow of time even when the activity itself is not 
articulated in terms of innings, periods, quarters, and so on.
 A final approach to play deserves to be mentioned because the 
notion of play as meaningful experience, which unifies the differ-
ent approaches to play as activity, attitude, and form, may be a 
derivative notion, dependent on an ontologically distinctive account 
of play that makes experiential accounts metaphorical rather than 
literal.
E. Play as an Ontologically Distinctive Phenomenon
In Truth and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer is not primarily inter-
ested in the concept of play. He is centrally concerned with the 
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question of truth and understanding in the human sciences. He 
attempts to give an account of hermeneutical consciousness that 
describes the proper role of the historicity of existence in human 
understanding. Gadamer’s discussion of play is merely a moment 
in his attempt to provide an analysis of aesthetic experience, an 
analysis that itself is a part of his monumental account of an expe-
rience of truth that cannot be reduced to scientific methods of 
understanding. Gadamer says, “The experience of the work of art 
includes understanding, and thus represents a hermeneutical phe-
nomenon—but not at all in the sense of a scientific method.”³5 
His account of play is, however, significant.
 Gadamer claims that play has its own mode of being and that 
play cannot be explained simply in terms of the subjectivity of the 
player. “Play has its own essence, independent of the consciousness 
of those who play.” Gadamer argues that play is analogous to the 
way in which a work of art is fulfilled in the aesthetic experience 
of a spectator and is the real “subject” of the experience. Play 
requires a player with a certain attitude in order to come into being, 
but play is not reducible to the player’s attitude; “play merely reaches 
presentation (Darstellung) through the players.” For Gadamer, when 
we attend to apparently metaphorical usages of “play,” when we 
speak of the play of light, waves, or natural forces, “what is intended 
is to-and-fro movement that is not tied to any goal which would 
bring it to an end.” It is a mistake to think that these usages are 
figurative whereas our references to human or animal play are lit-
eral. The subject of play is play itself, not the subjectivity of the 
player. “Play clearly represents an order in which the to-and-fro 
movement of play follows of itself. It is part of play that the move-
ment is not only without goal or purpose, but also without effort.” 
The experience of freedom from the strains of ordinary life is the 
result of play playing itself through the player. “The structure of 
play absorbs the player into itself, and thus frees him from the bur-
den of taking the initiative, which constitutes the actual strain of 
existence.” For Gadamer, the mode of being of play is a “pure self-
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representation.” Nature, in its unceasing, purposeless movement, 
renewing itself in “constant repetition,” also exemplifies the being 
of mobility as self-representation. “Thus in this sphere it becomes 
finally meaningless to distinguish between literal and metaphorical 
usage.”³6
 If Gadamer’s approach seems unduly opaque and metaphysically 
obscure, consider the claim that his approach to play helps clarify 
the “playful character of the contest.” For those who deny that 
contests or competitive games can be play, he reminds us that 
“through the contest arises the tense to-and-fro movement from 
which the victor emerges, and thus the whole becomes a game.”³7 
Gadamer’s ontological approach clarifies the ordinary view that 
players (or spectators, for that matter) can develop a love or respect 
for “the game” as an independent phenomenon that is, in a sense, 
larger than the players, just as aesthetic appreciation or aesthetic 
experience recognizes the autonomy of a work of art standing over 
against the aesthetic consciousness as a demanding and authorita-
tive presence.³8 The game or the work of art constitutes a reality 
in itself. “In cases where human subjectivity is what is playing, the 
primacy of the game over the players engaged in it is experienced 
by the players themselves in a special way.” Gadamer’s comment 
reflects the development of our discussion of the metaphysics of 
play, in which the subjective approach to play is corrected by refer-
ences to form or structure. Gadamer’s remarks ring true, both phe-
nomenologically and ontologically, when he comments that the 
“attraction of a game, the fascination it exerts, consists precisely in 
the fact that the game masters the players.” The player gives herself 
over to the game, or, if there is some dispute about speaking of a 
“game” in terms of the development of certain sporting skills, the 
player is taken up by her enjoyable experience of confronting gra-
tuitous difficulties (or unnecessary obstacles). When the game is 
played, the “real subject of the game . . . is not the player, but 
instead the game itself. What holds the player in its spell, draws 
him into play, and keeps him there is the game itself.” Attitudes 
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are intentionally related to the nature of the task required for play-
ing the game. “One can say that performing a task successfully 
‘presents it’ (stellt sie dar).” Hence, we again arrive at the notion 
that playing games (or overcoming unnecessary obstacles), insofar 
as they are purposeless, that is, ends in themselves, shows that “play 
is really limited to presenting itself. Thus its mode of being is self-
presentation.”³9
 Gadamer summarizes his approach to play: “We have seen that 
play does not have its being in the player’s consciousness or atti-
tude, but on the contrary play draws him into its dominion and 
fills him with its spirit. The player experiences the game as a reality 
that surpasses him.” Gadamer affirms the supposedly “ridiculous” 
notion that sport, as such, conceived broadly as game playing (in 
Suits’s own sense), is play, ontologically interpreted as presenting 
itself in the tasks defined by the “make-believe goals of the game,” 
in Gadamer’s words.40 Gadamer’s account of play returns us to the 
first approach or moment in our discussion, when play is taken to 
be behavior or action, some observable natural phenomenon char-
acterized, much as Gadamer describes, as spontaneous and pur-
poseless “to-and-fro movement.” The scientist then explains the 
phenomena biologically or in terms of neural development, the 
social scientist or humanist explains it in human terms, and we are 
led, dialectically, down a path that leads to Gadamer’s interpreta-
tion of the original phenomena, in which play is “decentered” and 
taken to be ontologically distinctive, manifested in and through 
natural events, animals, children, and adults.4¹
 Now we are in a position to bring these approaches together in 
order to offer some conclusions about the nature of play, its rela-
tion to sport, and its value and role in a good human life.
iii. Play, Pluralism, and Good Lives
We began our discussion by attending to some of Bernard Suits’s 
“words on play.” Suits, always playfully provocative, voiced suspi-
cions about attempts “to find play under nearly every rock in the 
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social landscape,” expressed doubts about those who make so much 
of the notion, offered his own attempt to place strict boundaries 
on the concept, and acknowledged that figurative uses of the word 
play force us to explain the relevant similarities and differences 
involved when we speak of the “play of light,” the “playful dog,” 
“child’s play,” “playing a game,” and “playing professional sports.” 
The upshot of our examination of approaches to play is evident. 
It is no wonder that play is found under nearly every rock in the 
social landscape, given the multiplicity of possible approaches and 
the legitimacy of each to tell us something important, even if 
incomplete, about the concept of play. Each approach picks out 
relevant properties generated by taking a certain descriptive or 
explanatory perspective on play phenomena. Each may claim to 
be a total account of play only by ignoring the legitimacy of other 
perspectives. Because of the plurality of the ways we can approach 
play, each should be taken to be a significant contribution to a 
nonreductive account of play.
 The new prophets of play, Brown, Ackerman, and others, attempt 
to rouse us out of the doldrums of ordinary existence by awaken-
ing (or reawakening) in us moments of joy, exuberance, creativity, 
spontaneity, freedom, optimism, and fun—often associated with 
activities that are usually a part of early life but somehow get lost 
along the way. In attempting to enliven us to the possibilities of 
playful experience, they connect play to a notion of a good human 
life. Recall the initial comments by McGinn, Brown, and Acker-
man. McGinn’s comments on play are secondary; they arise in an 
intellectual memoir that is robust and confessional about the role 
of sports and games in his life, from childhood and adolescence 
through adulthood: marbles, trampolining, diving, pole vaulting, 
table tennis, bowling, pinball, fishing, squash, running, video 
games, lifting weights, skiing, kayaking, windsurfing, and tennis! 
Of course sport is play, he tells us. Brown and Ackerman are most 
interested in play, not sport, yet both assume in some of their com-
ments that sporting activities are playful activities. Sport should be 
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placed in the context of play and living well—joyously, freely, cre-
atively. They call us to the possible enchantment of moments of 
our lives, when we are captivated by the absorbing activities that 
enable us to transcend everyday life, to “suspend the ordinary,” as 
Kenneth Schmitz described the “essence” of play.4²
 So, is sport an expression of play? Should we understand sport 
in terms of the concept of play? As far as I can tell, there are two 
primary reasons given for resisting the relationship, one of which 
we have already examined. Both avenues of criticism claim that 
sport may be infected by desires that are incompatible with play. 
Many claim, as Suits does, that play for pay is not really play, that 
professional sport is instrumental rather than autotelic. As we have 
seen, this view falls prey to the problem of mixed motives and 
involves the reduction of play to attitudinal considerations, ignor-
ing the relevance of other properties, both structural and experi-
ential. Activities may be characterized in complex ways, and the 
rejection of professional sport as play on attitudinal grounds hides 
the ways in which such activities have playlike properties. More-
over, even if Suits and others are right about the dissociation of 
professional sport and play, in numerous instances in which people 
play sports, the activities embody many properties that are associ-
ated with play: freedom, separateness, absorption, purposelessness, 
and so on.
 The other avenue of criticism stresses the role of the desire to 
win in sports, rather than the extent to which sporting activities 
may be infected by elements that make sports one’s work or pro-
fession. Suits also argues that the compulsion to win, even for sup-
posed amateurs like Olympic athletes, is incompatible with the 
notion that play must be engaged in as an end in itself. The stron-
ger version of this criticism comes from Alfie Kohn, who insists 
that any desire to win, not simply an overarching compulsion, dis-
qualifies an activity from being play. For Kohn, play and competi-
tion are incompatible. Since sport, by its very nature, involves 
competition, sport and play are incompatible. Because play involves 
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the familiar idea of choosing an activity for its own sake, play can 
have “no goal other than itself.” Competition is rule governed, often 
extrinsically motivated (by the desire for social approval), and goal 
oriented (a product orientation), rather than being a “process ori-
entation.” Therefore, because sport is competitive, “sports never 
really qualified as play in the first place. Although it is not gener-
ally acknowledged, most definitions of play do seem to exclude 
competitive activities.”4³
 Kohn is undoubtedly correct to emphasize the dangers of com-
petition, and the metaphor he uses is apt: “Clearly competition 
and play tug in two different directions. If you are trying to win, 
you are not engaged in true play.”44 Yet there is more insight in his 
view when he resorts to metaphor than when he engages in essen-
tialist pronouncements. There is no essence of play. If we recognize 
the multiplicity of relevant considerations involved when we 
attempt to understand play phenomena, we should resist Kohn’s 
view that play can be neither competitive nor rule governed. To 
say that play cannot be rule governed seems to reduce playful activ-
ities to frolic. However, there are more or less formal modes of play 
that many have pointed out. Rules may be formulated to create 
noncompetitive games (leapfrog) or games in which there is an 
internal goal (winning) sought by participants if they intend to 
engage in the activity. To say that play cannot be “goal oriented” 
either reduces it to frolic or equivocates on the notion of the “goal” 
of the activity in question. Certainly, playing a game, attempting 
to overcome unnecessary obstacles, or freely confronting gratuitous 
difficulty may be engaged in for the sake of the activity, even if the 
activity has an internal end that cannot be shared by the victor and 
the vanquished. Also, overcoming obstacles within the game means 
that sport, construed as game playing or skills development, is “goal 
oriented.” The process itself has internal products. The process may 
or may not also have extrinsic motives, but those considerations 
must be placed along with others that count for or against our 
judgment about the way to categorize certain activities.
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 In the end, if we are reminded of the multiple approaches to play 
and the varieties of usages, both literal and figurative, that are 
involved when we refer to the concept of play, we are left with a 
framework within which to sort out relevant similarities and dif-
ferences when we speak in terms related to play. I do not think that 
a pluralist account of play leaves things too open-ended, nor do I 
think that there are no constraints on what we call play. No doubt 
such an account does leave things more messy than Suits’s essen-
tialism suggests, but that is because of the complexity of the phe-
nomena and the nature of the concept of play. Given what we have 
said about the variety of approaches to play, the fecundity of play 
phenomena, and the connection between play and a good human 
life, we should reinforce, whenever it is appropriate, the notion 
that sport is found in the neighborhood of play. And we should do 
this in order to encourage the enchanting possibilities of sport, 
play, and life itself. When we find that sport has strayed from its 
natural home, we must encourage the wayward child to come back 
from the world.
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